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INJUNCTIONS AGAINST OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS: 
TOWARD A SAFE WORKPLACE ENVIRONMENT 
Rhonda G. Hollander· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, at an automobile casting plant in Michigan an em-
ployee was assigned the job of dumping conveyor bucket carriers 
filled with scrap through holes, each approximately four and one-
half feet square, in a platform forty-three feet above the ground. 
The platform had seventeen such unguarded openings regularly 
spaced along its length. While performing his assigned task the 
employee fell through one of the unguarded holes and sustained 
serious physical injuries.1 The existence of such workplace hazards 
is'not uncommon at manufacturing facilities and construction sites 
throughout the United States. It is therefore essential that atten-
tion be focused on the options open to individual employees faced 
with unsafe working conditions. 
In 1970, in response to the increasing number and severity of 
work-related injuries and illnesses in the United States,· Congress 
passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act.s However, for a 
variety of reasons that Act has failed to deal effectively with the 
circumstances which led to its enactment, and the problem of as-
suring safe and healthful workplaces for working men and women 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Facts derived from Moore v. Giffels Associates, Inc., No. 75-058, 910-NP (D. Mich. Sept. 
12, 1979). 
• 29 U.S.C. § 651(a) (1976); S. REP. No. 1282, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 5177-78. 
• Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 to 678 (1976». 
133 
134 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 9:133 
is still one of great magnitude.· The importance of safety necessi-
tates that an employee have effective avenues of redress open to 
him. One option of great value may be his ability to gain direct 
access to the courts for relief. Yet, the existence of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act, a comprehensive legislative scheme 
under which there is no private right of action, may impede direct 
employee access to the courts. Congressional enactment of such an 
exhaustive administrative remedy was simultaneously a require-
ment that it be utilized. Moreover, for the employee in a union 
shop who is party to a collective bargaining agreement, the strong 
labor policy in this country which manifests a deference to collec-
tive action may be a further factor inhibiting his ability to act in-
dependently to remedy his situation. 
This article considers whether an individual employee can, con-
sistent with the Occupational Safety and Health Act and American 
labor policy, maintain a private action to enjoin unsafe working 
conditions. First, the adequacy of employee protection under the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act and other federal statutes 
pertinent to workplace safety is considered. Next, the availability 
of an injunction is evaluated in light of the existence of the Act. 
Finally, consideration is given to the appropriateness of deferring 
the prevailing labor policy when a safety issue is being addressed. 
Reasons and precedent for the accommodation of labor policy in a 
safety context are examined. 
II. SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE: A STATUTORY SCHEME 
A. The Enactment of the Occupational and Safety and Health 
Act: Legislative Recognition of the Importance of Safety in 
the Workplace 
In 1970, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act (the Act)1I in order "to assure so far as possible every working 
man and woman in the nation safe and healthful working condi-
tions and to preserve our human resources.'" This was explicit rec-
ognition of the increasing number and severity of work-related in-
juries and illnesses and their adverse impact on the economy and 
the human condition.? This Act was the first comprehensive at-
• See note 7 infra. 
• Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 to 678 (1976». 
• 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976). 
• Id. § 651(a); S. REP. No. 1282, reprinted in (1970) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5177-
1980] SAFE WORKPLACE 135 
tempt by the federal government to provide a safe workplace envi-
ronment for working men and women.- The emphasis in the Act is 
on prevention rather than treatment and compensation for injury.· 
Its preventive purpose is clearly set forth in the Act's statement of 
purpose and policy,IO and a complex legal and administrative 
framework is developed to facilitate its achievement.ll 
Of particular significance is the requirement that each employer 
comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated 
under the Act.11 The Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (OSHA) is designated by the Act to set these mandatory stan-
dards with the aid of the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH), a research body responsible for devel-
oping and recommending standards, and other federal bodies es-
tablished by the Act.18 
In order to supplement the employee protection provided by 
mandatory health and safety standards, the Act also imposes on 
78. The National Safety Council has estimated that 14,000 deaths and 2.2 million disabling 
injuries occur annually due to accidents on the job. These statistics may understate the 
problem since, for the most part, they do not reflect occupational disease. The Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare has estimated that 390,000 new cases of occupational 
disease appear annually and as many as 100,000 deaths occur each year as a result of occu-
pational disease. N. AsHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE 46-47 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
AsHFORD]. 
• AsHFORD, supra note 7, at 142. 
• Id. at 5. For legislation which deals solely with compensation for work injuries, Bee The 
Compensation for Work Injuries Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101 to 8193 (1976). 
10 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(I)-(b)(13) (1976). 
11 Several federal bodies are designated by the Act to provide the support necessary to 
administer and enforce it. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) lo-
cated within the Department of Labor is charged with administering the provisions of the 
Act. The Act requires OSHA to set mandatory occupational safety and health standards 
applicable to businesses affecting interstate commerce and to conduct inspections of work 
places covered under the Act for the purpose of assuring compliance with the Act. 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 655, 657(a) (1976). OSHA has the power to i88ue citations and assess penalties against 
employers for violations. Id. §§ 658, 666. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Com-
mi88ion exists as an independent, quasi-judicial body that reviews all challenged enforce-
ment actions of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Id. § 661. The National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), a research body located within the 
Department of Health, Education I: Welfare, is responsible for developing and recom-
mending occupational safety and health standards. Id. § 671. Furthermore, the National 
Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety and Health (NACOSH) is appointed by the 
Secretary of Labor to advise the Secretaries of Labor and HEW on matters relating to the 
administration of the Act. Id. § 656(a). The Secretary of Labor may also appoint other 
advisory committees to aid him in his standard-setting functions under the Act. Id. 
§ 656(b). 
11 Id. § 654(a)(2); see text at notes 21-35 infra. 
11 ~ note 11 supra. 
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each coveredl4 employer a general duty to "furnish to each of his 
employees employment and a place of employment which are free 
from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause death 
or serious physical harm to his employees."lll The potential defi-
ciency of the Act without some type of general duty obligation was 
explicitly recognized and discussed in its legislative history. The 
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, which reported 
on the proposed legislation stated: 
The committee recognizes that precise standards to cover every con-
ceivable situation will not always exist. This legislation would be seri-
ously deficient if any employee were killed or seriously injured on the 
job simply because there was no specific standard applicable to a rec-
ognized hazard which could result in such a misfortune. Therefore, to 
cover such circumstances the committee has included a requirement to 
the effect that employers are to furnish employment and places of em-
ployment which are free from recognized hazards to the health and 
safety of their employees. Ie 
It is clear that existing and potential health and safety standards 
and the general duty obligation were seen as cornerstones of the 
federal legislative program to assure workplace safety. 
B. The Inadequacy of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
and the Need for Other Avenues of Redress 
Despite its comprehensive nature, it is widely agreed that the 
Act has not lived up to its stated purpose17 or the lofty expecta-
tions commentators had for it. II In the words of one author: 
The OSH Act has failed thus far to live up to its potential for reduc-
ing job injury and disease, for fostering the internalization of the social 
cost of health and safety hazards, for encouraging technological innova-
tions, or for stimulating job redesign. OSHA has had little measurable 
impact in reducing injuries and deaths, and the problems in the health 
,< Generally, the Act applies to any employer who is engaged in a business affecting com-
merce in the United States or any territory administered by the United States. ASHFORD, 
supra note 7, at 143; 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1976). 
II 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1976). 
,e S. REP. No. 1282, reprinted in (1970) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5185-86 . 
.. The congressional articulation of the purpose of the Act may be found at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 651(b) (1976). 
18 See, e.g., Gross, The Occupational Safety & Health Act: Much Ado About Something, 
3 Loy. OHIO L.J. 247 (1972). 
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area have become even more serious since 1970.1• 
In essence, "effective, prompt law enforcement has not occurred. ''10 
One major problem is the minimal number of standards which 
have been developed under the Act. Occupational safety and 
health standards may be categorized into three classes based on 
method of promulgation: a) existing (interim) standards adopted 
under section 6(a);ll b) new (permanent) standards promulgated 
pursuant to section 6(b);11 and c) emergency temporary standards 
adopted under section 6(C).I' Section 6(a) authorized the Secretary 
of Labor to promulgate as an occupational safety or health stan-
dard, for a period ending two years after the effective date of the 
Act," any national consensus standardll and any established fed-
eral standard. Ie Such standards were not subject to rule-making 
procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act.17 The 
Secretary used. the expedited section 6(a) procedure to adopt 
scores of national consensus and federal standards which comprise 
the main body of what are now called the general industry 
standards. IS 
.t AsHFORD, supra note 7, at 13 . 
.. Blumrosen, Ackerman, KUgerman, Van Schaick, & Sheehy, Injunctions Against Occu-
pational Hazards: The Right to Work Under Safe Conditions, 64 CALII'. L. REv. 702, 715 
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen). See also Metzenbaum, The Occupational Safety 
and Health Act: A Promise That Failed, 8 AKRON L. REv. 416 (1975). 
I. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976). 
II Id. § 655(b). 
II Id. § 655(c). 
If The effective date of the Act was 120 days after Dec. 29, 1970, Pub. L. 91-596 § 34. 
II 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976). Section 3(9) defines a "national consensus standard" as: any 
occupational safety and health standard or modification thereof which (1) has been adopted 
and promulgated by a nationally recognized standards-producing organization under proce-
dures whereby it can be determined by the Secretary that persons interested and affected 
by the scope or provisions of the standard have reached substantial agreement on its adop-
tion, (2) was formulated in a manner which afforded an opportunity for diverse views to be 
considered and (3) has been designated as such a standard by the Secretary, after consulta-
tion with other appropriate Federal agencies. 29 U.S.C. § 652(9) (1976). 
It Id. § 655(a) (1976). Section 3(10) defines "established Federal Standard" as "any oper-
ative occupational safety and health standard established by any agency of the United 
States and presently in effect, or contained in any Act of CODgreBB in force on December 29, 
1970." 29 U.S.C. § 652(10) (1976). 
17 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). Congress reasoned that established federal standards had already 
been exposed to procedural scrutiny by other agencies, and national consensus standards 
were developed after public debate. As a consequence these standards could be adopted 
immediately to protect employees without infringing on employers' procedural rights. M. 
ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAI'BTY AND HEALTH LAW 41 (1978). 
It 1 EMPL. SAI'BTY & HEALTH GumE (CCH) , 1022 (1977). 
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Subsequent to 1973, however, the section 6(a) procedure ceased 
to be available for adoption of standards. The procedures provided 
under sections 6(b) and G(c) remain the sole means available to the 
Secretary for standard promulgation. Under section G(b) the Secre-
tary of Labor "may by rule promulgate, modify or revoke any oc-
cupational safety or health standard"·· if he complies with the de-
tailed rule-making procedures specified in that section. Under 
section G(c), the Secretary must provide for an emergency tempo-
rary standard to take immediate effect upon publication in the 
Federal Register if he determines "(A) that employees are exposed 
to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined 
to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards, and (B) that 
such emergency standard is necessary to protect employees from 
such danger."8o However, an emergency temporary standard may 
remain in effect for only six months;81 thereafter, the Secretary 
must adopt a permanent standard or the protection of the tempo-
rary standard will cease. 
To date, OSHA has adopted only eleven new permanent safety 
standards81 and twenty-four new permanent health standards.88 In 
many cases the permanent standards were challenged in the 
courts.84 The numerous legal and political problems encountered 
.. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1976) . 
.. Id. § 655(c)(1). 
11 Id. § 655(c)(3) . 
.. The eleven safety standards are: Servicing Multi-Piece Rim Wheels, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1910.177; Helicopters, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.183 (1979); Slings, Id. § 1910.184; Telecommunica-
tions, Id. § 1910.268; National Electrical Code, Id. § 1910.309; Rollover Protective Struc-
tures; Overhead Protection, Id. §§ 1926.1000-.1003; Rollover Protective Structures, Id. 
§§ 1928.51-.53; and Guarding of Farm Field Equipment, Farmstead Equipment, and Cotton 
Gins,Id. § 1928.57. 
II The 24 health standards are: Air contaminants, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (1979); Asbestos, 
Id. § 1910.1001; 4-Nitrobiphenyl, Id. § 1910.1003; alpha-Naphthylamine, Id. § 1910.1004; 
Methyl chloromethyl ether, Id. § 1910.1006; 3,3" -Dichlorobenzidine (and its salts), Id. 
§ 1910.1007; bis-chloromethyl ether, Id. § 1910.1008; beta-Naphthylamine, Id. §1910.1009; 
Benzidine, Id. § 1910.1010; 4-Aminodiphenyl, Id. § 1910.1011; Ethyleneimine, Id. 
§ 1910.1012; beta-Propiolactone, Id. § 1910.1013; 2-Acetylamino6uorene, Id. § 1910.1014; 4-
Dimethylaminoazobenzene, Id. § 1910.1015; n-Nitrosodimethylamine, Id. § 1910.1016; Vinyl 
chloride,Id. § 1910.1017; Inorganic arsenic, Id. § 1910.1018; Lead, Id. § 1910.1025, Benzene, 
Id. § 1910.1028; Coke oven emissions, Id. § 1910.1029; Cotton dust, Id. § 1910.1043; 1, 2-
dibromo-3-chloropropane, Id. § 1910.1044; Acrylonitrile, Id. § 1910.1045; and Exposure to 
cotton dust in cotton gins, Id. § 1910.1046 . 
.. ASHPORD, supra note 7, at 158. For cases upholding OSHA standards see, e.g., Syn-
thetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Brennan, 506 F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 2 OSHC 1654 (May 1975); Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodg-
son, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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by OSHA in promulgating permanent standardssil necessitate that 
it proceed with great care in this process and have adequate tech-
nical data to support its standards requirements. As a conse-
quence, it is unlikely that the rate of standard promulgation will 
accelerate in the future. 
Since only a relatively small number of health and safety stan-
dards have been developed under the Act, the general duty clauseS. 
remains "the only viable enforcement mechanism for protection 
from the majority of health hazards. "S1 However, the potential use-
fulness of the general duty clause has been limited. The Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Commission" has held that an 
employer may not be cited under the general duty clause when 
there exists a specific standard covering the condition.s9 In addi-
tion, the usefulness of the general duty clause has been severely 
restricted in those circuits which adopted the approach delineated 
in National Realty and Construction Company, Inc. v. Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Commission.40 In that case, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission reversed its 
hearing examiner who had dismissed an OSHA citation against 
National Realty and instead found National Realty in serious vio-
lation of the general duty clause for permitting an employee to 
stand as a passenger on the running board of a front-end loader 
while the loader was in motion. The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit concluded there was not substantial evi-
•• AsHrORD, supra note 7, at 154-59. Note the discussion of the special problems which 
were encountered in setting carcinogen standards. See also Industrial Union Department, 
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 48 U.S.L.W. 5022 (1980) . 
.. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (a)(l) (1976) . 
• 7 ASHFORD, supra note 7, at 163. See Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970,86 HARV. L. REv. 988 (1973) for a discussion of the 
meaning of and problema raised by the general duty clause. 
II See note 11 supra. Final orders of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Com-
mission may, on petition, be reviewed by a United States court of appeals. M. ROTHSTEIN, 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HBALTH LAW § 342 (1978). 
II Brisk Water Proofing Co., Inc., [1973-1974] OSHD (CCH) ~ 16,345 (July 1973) (general 
duty citation for unsafe provision of access to a scaffold held invalid where a particular 
standard applied to the alleged violation); Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., [1973-1974] 
OSHD (CCH) ~ 16,725 (October 1973) (citation for violation of the general duty clause dis-
missed on the ground that employer was cited on the same facts for a violation of a more 
specific standard). 4. 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973); accord Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. OSHRC, 601 
F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1979); Champlin Petroleum Co. v. OSHRC, 593 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1979); 
Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Usery, 579 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1978); General Elec. Co. 
v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1976); Brennan v. OSHRC, 502 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1974). 
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dence to support the Commission's finding. It held that to sustain 
his burden of proof on a general duty charge the Secretary of La-
bor must specify the particular steps a cited employer should have 
taken to avoid citation and demonstrate the feasibility and likely 
utility of those measures.41 Stricter requirements for proving a vio-
lation of the general duty clause serve to further limit employee 
protection from potential health hazards, particularly since one 
reason that more health standards have not been issued is that in-
dustrial hygiene data is often inconclusive.·1 The relative ineffec-
tiveness of the general duty clause as a tool for prevention of occu-
pational injury is indicated by the fact that it is most frequently 
cited during inspections occasioned by accidents which have al-
ready caused severe injury or death.48 
The extent of OSHA's enforcement activity also detracts from 
the Act's effectiveness as a means for providing safe working condi-
tions. The total number of inspections conducted by OSHA de-
clined from 108,796 in 1976 to 57,242 in 1978,·· and only 28% of 
the violations cited in 1978 were classified as serious.·11 In fact, 
OSHA's statistics for October 1977 through August 1978 show that 
no citations were issued at all in 54 percent of the health complaint 
investigations, 32 percent of the safety complaint investigations, 
and 30 percent of the safety complaint investigations involving 
both safety and health.·· Among those inspections initiated 
through complaints, cited violations are seldom categorized as seri-
ous. Furthermore, in a recent report, the General Accounting Office 
criticized OSHA for not responding quickly enough to complaints 
which involved potentially serious hazards. n 
It is clear that the inadequacy of administrative enforcement 
under the Act has detracted significantly from its ability to amelio-
rate the problems which necessitated its enactment. To some ex-
.. National Realty and Construction Co., Inc. v.OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 
1973) . 
•• ASHFORD, supra note 7, at 163 . 
•• 1. EMPL. SAl'ETY &: HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) , 1002 (1979) . 
•• [1978-1979 Transfer Binder) EMPL. SAl'ETY &: HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 11 11,688 . 
•• Id. It should also be noted that the percentage of violations classified as serious did not 
exceed 4% in each of the years from 1973-1976 and was only 14% in 1977. The percentage 
increased to 28% in 1978. Id . 
•• Id. 11 11,665 . 
.. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFnCE, How EFFECTIVE ARE OSHA's COMPLAINT PROCE-
DURES (1979), noted in [1978-1979 Transfer Binder)EMPL. SAFETY &: HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 
11 11,665. 
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tent, though, other federal statutes and regulations may operate to 
fill the void created by the disappointing results obtained through 
enforcement of the Act. 
III. OTHER AVENUES OF RECOURSE FOR THE EMPLOYEE 
It is generally agreed that no private cause of action arises under 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act.f8 Courts have viewed the 
express provisions of the Act" and the comprehensive adminstra-
tive apparatus created to enforce it80 as indicating congressional 
intent that no private cause of action for damages should arise. 
Yet, the inadequacy of enforcement under the Act clearly points 
up the need for other avenues of relief for affected employees. In 
this section, other options open to the employee faced with hazard-
ous working conditions are explored. 
A. Statutory Options 
1. The Strike 
Under federal labor law, employees are permitted to walk off the 
job without reprisal in two instances: 1) where such conduct can be 
deemed protected concerted activity under section 7 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act,11 and 2) where obeying a work order 
would place an employee in a situation of abnormal danger to his 
safety or health. II However, these- statutory paths are fraught with 
•• See, e.g., Russell v. Bartley, 494 F. 2d 334 (6th Cir. 1974); Skidmore v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 356 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La. 1973), off'd, 483 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973); Annot., 35 ALR 
Fed. 461 (1977). 
It should be noted that under § 13(a) 'of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1976), the Secretary 
of Labor may seek an order "to restrain any conditions or practices in any place of employ-
ment which are such that a danger exists which could reasonably be expected to cause death 
or serious physical harm immediately or before the imminence of such danger can be elimi-
nated through the enforcement procedures otherwise provided by this chapter." If the Sec-
retary "arbitrarily or capriciously" fails to seek relief under § 13(a), any employee who could 
be injured by reason of such failure may seek a writ of mandamus under § 13(d) to compel 
the Secretary to seek an order. 29 U.S.C. § 662(d) (1976) . 
•• 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1976). The language of this section has been interpreted as evi-
dencing a congressional intention that there be no private civil remedy under the Act. See, 
e.g., Russell v. Bartley, 494 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1974). 
10 See note 11 supra. 
6' 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Section 7 provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . . . .. 
U Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976). 
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practical hazards and the individual employee who undertakes to 
refuse unsafe work in reliance upon them may be risking sanctions 
up to and including job loss. 
For a section 7 safety walkout, employees need only have a sub-
jective belief that working conditions are unsafe. as However, only 
concerted activity is protected by section 7. In order for refusal to 
accept hazardous work to qualify as concerted activity it must 
meet several requirements," including a requirement that the ac-
tivity further some group interest. Thus, section 7 is only available 
when hazardous work is refused for the mutual benefit of other 
employees as well; a solitary employee who refuses work solely on 
behalf of himself will not be protected. 1111 Moreover, where a collec-
tive bargaining agreement contains a no-strike clause, union-sanc-
tioned walkoft's over health and safety are restricted under section 
7,116 and "[w]alkoft's by a minority of employees is in derogation of 
the union and in conflict with the union's exclusive representation 
would not be protected by [section] 7."11'1 Finally, the coverage of 
section 7 is limited. It does not protect supervisors" or agricultural 
workers,1I9 and small employers are exempt because the National 
Labor Relations Board does not choose to exercise jurisdiction over 
them.60 
I. Union Boiler Co. 213 N.L.R.B. No. 113 (1974), enforced, 530 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1975) . 
.. "(1) there must be a work-related complaint or grievance; (2) the concerted activity 
must further some group interest; (3) a specific remedy or result must be sought through 
such activity; and (4) the activity should not be unlawful or otherwise improper." Shelly & 
Anderson Furniture Mfg. Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 497 F.2d 1200, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 1974). 
II See Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1979); N.L.R.B. v. C & I Air 
Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1973); Pacific Electricord Co. v. N.L.R.B., 361 
F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1966) . 
.. See, e.g., Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 491 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1974). 
IT Ashford & Katz, Unsafe Working Conditions: Employee Rights Under the Labor 
Management Relations Act and the Occupational Safety & Health Act, 52 NOTRE DAME 
LAWYER 802, 805 (1977) . 
.. E.g., Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965); 
N.L.R.B. v. Silver Bay Local Union No. 962, 498 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1974). 
I. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 726 n.23 (6th Cir. 1979). 
eo [d. Even where the National Labor Relations Board has power to act, a 1959 amend-
ment to the NLRA gives the Board discretion to decline jurisdiction over labor disputes 
involving any class or category of employers where the effect of such labor dispute on com-
merce is insubstantial. The Board's discretion is limited in only one respect: jurisdiction 
cannot be declined over a case which would have been accepted under NLRB jurisdictional 
yardsticks (standards) prevailing on August I, 1959. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(l) (1976). Those 
yardsticks require assertion of jurisdiction for retail concerns only if the gr088 yearly volume 
of business is over $500,000. 1 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 11 1610 (1972). 
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An alternative to the section 7 walkout is provided in section 502 
of the Taft Hartley Act which states in relevant part: "nor shall 
the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith 
because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place 
of employment of such employee or employees be deemed a strike 
under this chapter.,,.1 Yet, despite its "good faith" language, the 
standard for proving the existence of section 502 "abnormally dan-
gerous conditions" is an objective one. In Gateway Coal Co. v. 
United Mine Workers of America,'· the Supreme Court held that 
the union must submit "ascertainable, objective evidence support-
ing its conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition for work 
exists."88 Thus, an employee who claims section 502 protection 
must be correct as to the existence of an abnormally dangerous 
condition in order to be protected against employer reprisals. He 
must also present evidence acceptable as proof of the presence of 
abnormal danger. One commentatorS4 researched the judicial de-
velopments relating to section 502 in an attempt to determine 
under what circumstances working conditions are abnormally dan-
gerous to the extent that a job action would be protected activity. 
He stated: 
The obvious conclusion to be drawn from [an] analysis of Section 
502 is that reliance upon its protection by employees is a very compli-
cated and risky matter .... The employees must consider the extent 
and abnormality of the danger, they must plot a course of action which 
is protected and, hopefully, they will map a strategy conducive to a 
favorable settlement. 
All of these responsibilities are fraught with another form of indus-
trial danger, i.e., discharge.81 
2. The Retaliatory Discharge Provision of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act 
The Secretary of Labor has interpreted the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act's retaliatory discharge provision" as protecting an 
11 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976) . 
.. 414 U.S. 368 (1974) . 
.. [d. at 387 (quoting dissenting opinion, Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of 
America, 466 F.2d 1167, 1162 (3d Cir. 1972» . 
.. Ferris, Resolving Safety Disputes: Work or Walk, 26 LAB. L.J. 695 (1976) . 
.. [d. at 704 . 
.. 29 U.S.C. § 66O(c)(l) (1976). This provides: 
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because 
such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any pro-
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employee who, with no reasonable alternative, withdraws from 
danger of serious injury or death on the job. Under a Labor De-
partment regulation,8' an employee is protected where (a) if possi-
ble, he previously sought and was unable to obtain a correction of 
the dangerous condition, (b) his fear of the condition was objec-
tively reasonable, and (c) there was insufficient time due to the 
urgency of the situation to eliminate the danger through resort to 
regular OSHA enforcement channels. 
Id . 
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of 
ceeding under or related to [the Act] or has testified or is about to testify in any such 
proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or others of 
any right afforded by [the Act]. 
.. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1973). The regulation provides: 
Id. 
(a) In addition to protecting employees who file complaints, institute proceedings, or 
testify in proceedings under or related to the Act, section l1(c) also protects employees 
from discrimination occurring because of the exercise "of any right afforded by this Act." 
Certain rights are explicitly provided in the Act; for example, there is a right to partici-
pate as a party in enforcement proceedings (sec. 10). Certain other rights exist by neces-
sary implication. For example, employees may request information from the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health' Administration; such requests would constitute the exercise of 
a right afforded by the Act. Likewise, employees interviewed by agents of the Secretary 
in the course of inspections or investigations could not subsequently be discriminated 
against because of tJteir cooperation. 
(b)(l) On the other hand, review of the Act and examination of the legislative history 
discloses that, as a general matter, there is no right afforded by the Act which would 
entitle employees to walk off the job because of potential unsafe conditions at the work-
place. Hazardous conditions which may be violative of the Act will ordinarily be cor-
rected by the employer, once brought to his attention. If corrections are not accom-
plished, or if there is dispute about the existence of a hazard, the employee will normally 
have opportunity to request inspection of the workplace pursuant to section 8(0 of the 
Act, or to seek the assistance of other public agencies which have responsibility in the 
field of safety and health. Under such circumstances, therefore, an employer would not 
ordinarily be in violation of section l1(c) by taking action to discipline an employee for 
refusing to perform normal job activities because of alleged safety or health hazards. (2) 
However, occasions might arise when an employee is confronted with a choice between 
not performing assigned tasks or subjecting himself to serious injury or death arising 
from a hazardous condition at the workplace. If the employee, with no reasonable alter-
native, refuses in good faith to expose himself to the dangerous condition, he would be 
protected against subsequent discrimination. The condition causing the employee's ap-
prehension of death or injury must be of such a nature that a reasonable person, under 
the circumstances then confronting the employee, would conclude that there is a real 
danger of death or serious injury and that there is insufficient time, due to the urgency of 
the situation, to eliminate the danger through resort to regular statutory enforcement 
channels. In addition, in such circumstances, the employee, where possible, must also 
have sought from his employer, and been unable to obtain, a correction of the dangerous 
condition. 
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this regulation." Mter considering the Act's language and struc-
ture, the Court concluded that on its face the regulation furthered 
the overriding purpose of the Act and complemented its remedial 
scheme.'· Finding no contrary indication in the legislative history, 
the Court held that the regulation was "promulgated by the Secre-
tary in the valid exercise of his authority under the Act. '''70 
In sustaining the validity of the Secretary's regulation the Court 
further advanced the cause of adequate protection for employees: 
the regulation provides equitable relief for the employee dis-
charged or otherwise discriminated against for withdrawing from 
danger of serious injury or death on the job.71 However, the em-
ployee's decision to refuse work will not be free of risk. For the 
employee to be protected, his fear of danger must be objectively 
reasonable and must be subsequently vindicated by the courts.-'· 
The Supreme Court identified the conditions under which such 
subsequent vindication would be denied: "any employee who acts 
in reliance on the regulation runs the risk of discharge or repri-
mand in the event a court subsequently finds that he acted unrea-
sonably or· in bad faith."78 Moreover, consistent with the nonexis-
tence of a private right of action under the Act,'· the employee 
may not bring his own action for retaliatory discharge or discrimi-
nation. He must file a complaint with the Secretary and the Secre-
tary must determine after an investigation that judicial action 
against the employer is warranted.7I If the Secretary determines 
otherwise the employee is without remedy. 
B. The Availability of an Injunction 
The preceding brief overview of existing statutory remedies for 
employees faced with occupational hazards indicates there may be 
circumstances where the employee is less than adequately pro-
tected. Consider, for instance, the plight of an employee whose job 
is to perform singlehandedly a task for which no specific OSHA 
standards exist. He may suspect that performing the task has 
.. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 48 U.S.L.W. 4189 (1980) . 
.. [d. at 4192 . 
. .,. [d. at 4194-95. 
71 Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 734-35 (6th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 
4189 (1980). 
to [d. at 734. 
to Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 48 U.S.L.W. 4189, 4194 (1980). 
to See text at notes 48-50 supra. 
,. 29 U.S.C. § 66O(c)(2) (1976). 
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placed him in danger, yet he may not refuse to work for fear of 
discharge if the danger cannot subsequently be substantiated. A 
possible alternative for this employee is enforcement of his com-
mon law right to a safe workplace by way of injunction. An injunc-
tion is an order by a court sitting "in equity" that a party do, or 
refrain from doing, certain specified acts.7S In the case of an em-
ployee seeking to enjoin a workplace hazard, the order if granted 
would require removal or modification of the unsafe condition. 
1. The Common Law Right to a Safe Work Environment and the 
Question of Pre-emption 
The common law right to a safe workplace has its origin in the 
cases dealing with the tort liability of a master to his servant at 
common law." At common law it is the master's duty to use rea-
sonable care to provide a proper and safe workplace, and failure to 
use reasonable diligence to protect the employee from unnecessary 
risks will cause the employer to be answerable for ensuing dam-
ages.78 Thus the employer is under an affirmative duty to provide a 
work area that is free from unsafe conditions. "Where an employer 
is under a common law duty to act, a court of equity may enforce 
an employee's rights by ordering the employer to eliminate any 
preventable hazardous condition which the court finds to exist. "79 
,. Dellapenna, Emergency Injunctions Under OSHA, 8 ENVT'L L. 723, 733 (1978). 
Generally, equity requires a petitioner to demonstrate four prerequisites for equitable re-
lief - that there is no adequate remedy at law; that there is a proper, generally legal, basis of 
liability; that the remedy is practicable to enforce; and that the granting of the remedy will 
not produce unfairness, unconscionability, or inequity. Id. at 734. In granting equitable re-
lief judicial discretion is bounded by these principles. Id. at 735. 
11 PROSSER, TORTS § 80 (4th ed. 1971). For a discussion of the emergence of the right to 
work under safe conditions, and extensive citations, see Blumrosen, supra note 20, at 708-
12. 1. PROSSER, TORTS § 80 (4th ed. 1971); Canonico v. Celanese Corp. of America, 11 N.J. 
Super. 445, 454, 78 A.2d 411, 416 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951), certification denied, 7 N.J. 77, 
80 A.2d 494 (1951). 
,. Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 524, 368 A.2d 408, 411 
(Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976). 
In Shimp, plaintiff, a telephone company secretary who was allergic to cigarette 
smoke, sought to have cigarette smoking enjoined in the area where she worked. Plaintiff 
attempted to alleviate the problem through the use of grievance mechanisms established 
by collective bargaining between defendant employer and her union; however, that ac-
tion resulted in a solution which proved unsuccessful. The Superior Court held that an 
employee has a common law right to a safe work environment and that the work area 
involved in the case was unsafe due to a preventable hazard. The Court ordered the 
defendant, New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, to provide safe working conditions for 
plaintiff by restricting smoking to a non-work area used as a lunchroom. Alfred W. 
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Such equitable proceedings have not been pre-empted by con-
gressional adoption of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 
This is made clear in the statutory language: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any man-
ner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish 
or affect in other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, 
or liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to 
injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course 
of, employment.8o 
This provision recognizes concurrent state power to act either leg-
islatively or judicially under the common law with regard to occu-
pational safety.81 In enacting the Act, Congress explicitly recog-
nized and reaffirmed the common law obligation to provide a safe 
and healthful work environment. This is indicated in the legisla-
tive history: 
Under principles of common law, individuals are obliged to refrain 
from actions which cause harm to others. Courts often refer to this as a 
general duty to others. . . . The committee believes that employers are 
equally bound by this general and common duty to bring no adverse 
effects to the life and health of their employees throughout the course 
of their employment. Employers have primary control of the work en-
vironment and should insure that it is safe and healthful. Section 5(a), 
in providing that employers must furnish employment 'which is free 
from recognized hazards so as to provide safe and healthful working 
conditions,' merely restates that each employer shall furnish this de-
gree of care.811 
Blumrosen, co-author of Injunctions Against Occupational Hazards: The Right to Work 
Under Safe Conditions, supra note 20, was of counsel and on the brief in the case. 
10 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1976) . 
• , Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 522, 368 A.2d 408, 411 
(Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976) . 
• 1 S. Rep. No. 1282, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5177, 5186 (empha-
sis supplied). There is similar language in H.R. REP. No. 1291, 9Ist Cong., 2d Sess. 21 
(1970). The text of the general duty clause as finally enacted differs from that referred to in 
the Senate Report. See text at note 15 supra. 
In Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 
86 HARv. L. REV. 988 (1973), the author characterizes the words "merely restates" as mis-
leading. He bases his conclusion on the fact that employee contribution to risk, injury, or 
death is irrelevant to employer liability once a statutory hazard independent of the em-
ployee misconduct is established (i.e. the common law defenses of contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk are not appropriate defenses to a charge of general duty violation). 
Such defenses would be inappropriate to an injunctive proceeding in any event. Blumrosen, 
supra note 20, at 713. 
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2. Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative 
Remedies 
Under the comprehensive administrative scheme set up by the 
Act, employees are afforded several rights and protections.88 One of 
the most significant is the ability of the employee to initiate in-
spections by filing a properly completed confidential complaint.84 
If the Secretary believes the complaint has merit, an inspection 
will be scheduled as soon as practicable, in accordance with estab-
lished inspection priorities.8& 
The existence of a federal administrative apparatus for dealing 
with employee complaints may be an obstacle in the way of direct 
employee access to state courts for injunctive relief. Application of 
the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion must be con-
sidered where an established administrative framework is present. 
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction addresses the question of 
whether a court or an administrative agency should make the ini-
tial decision on a given issue.88 This doctrine is conceptually based 
on the need for an orderly and reasonable coordination of the work 
of agencies and COurts.87 "The trial court should exercise its discre-
tion with an understanding that the legislature has created the 
agency in order to afford a systematic method of fact-finding and 
policy-making and that the agency's jurisdiction should be given 
.a 1. EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) '11 571 (1979). 
.. To meet the formality requirements of the Act, as outlined in section 8(f) of the Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 657(f) (1976), and 29 C.F.R. § 1903.11 (1979), a complaint must: 
a. Be reduced to writing (either on a Form OSHA-7 or in a letter); 
b. Allege that a violation of the Act exists in the workplace; 
c. Set forth with reasonable particularity the grounds upon which it is based. This does 
not mean that the complaint must 8pecify a particular standard; it need only specify a 
condition or practice that is hazardous, and if uncommon, why it is hazardous; and 
d. Be signed by one or more employees or their representatives. 
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION; OSHA FIELD OP-
ERATIONS MANUAL, ch. VI. .. 4340.3 (1979). Complaints may be filed orally, in person or by 
telephone; however, if a complaint does not meet the formality requirements specified iii the 
regulations, it will not be given the priority of a formal complaint, nor will the complainant 
be given the additional rights aft"orded a complainant with a formal complaint. [d. '11 4340.5 . 
•• M. RoTHSTEIN, OCCUPATION SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW, supra note 27, § 182. 
In determining workplace inspection priorities, OSHA has established a "worst first" ap-
proach. Inspections are ranked in the following order of priority: (1) imminent danger; (2) 
catastrophe and fatality investigations; (3) employee complaints; (4) special emphasis pro-
gram inspections; and (5) general (random) inspections. ld. at 214. See OSHA FIELD OPERA-
TIONS MANUAL, ch. IV '11 4327.2 (1979) . 
.. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 19.01 (1958) . 
•• G & A Contractors, Inc. v. Alaska Greenhouses, Inc., 517 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Alaska 1974). 
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priority in the absence of a valid reason for judicial intervention."88 
The purpose and operational concept underlying the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction indicate that under most circumstances it 
would be applicable in the case of an employee seeking an injunc-
tion under his common law right to a safe work environment. 
Thus, it appears an employee would at least have to request an 
OSHA inspection. 
The doctrine of exhaustion contemplates a situation where some 
administrative action is underway but is as yet uncompleted,S' and 
generally holds that administrative remedies must be exhausted 
before judicial relief is sought.'o This doctrine is applicable to ac-
tions for an injunction and may be the basis for a refusal by the 
court to entertain such an action.'! However, impossibility or im-
probability of obtaining adequate relief through pursuit of admin-
istrative remedies is often a reason for dispensing with the exhaus-
tion requirement.'· In particular, excessive delay may lead to a 
determination that the administrative remedy is inadequate.'a For 
the employee faced with a dangerous condition, OSHA's delay in 
conducting an inspection once a complaint is filed may provide a 
basis for circumventing the exhaustion requirement. For example, 
the General Accounting Office recently criticized OSHA for not re-
sponding quickly enough to complaints which involve potentially 
serious hazards." Delays of as long as 108 days were reported.'· In 
such situations an employee would be justified in claiming that his 
remedy at law was inadequate and thus any requirement of ex-
haustion should be waived. 
The foregoing analysis relating to primary jurisdiction and ex-
haustion of administrative remedies would be applicable to any 
employee seeking to enjoin an occupational hazard in state court. 
In order to evaluate the availability of an injunction in light of pre-
II Wisconsin Collectors Ass'n. v. Thorp Fin. Corp., 32 Wis.2d 36, 45, 145 N.W.2d 33, 37 
(1966), quoted in State v. Dairyland Power Coop., 52 Wis.2d 45, 56, 187 N.W.2d 878, 883 
(Wis. 1971). 
II [d. at 54, 187 N.W.2d at 882. 
10 See 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVB LAw TRBATlSB, ch. 20 (1958) . 
• , See Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947); Myers v. Bethle-
hem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) . 
.. K. DAVIS, ADMlNlSTRATIVB LAw TBxT § 20.07 (3d ed. 1972) . 
•• [d. See Smith v. Dlinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926) . 
.. U.S. GENBRAL ACCOUNTING OrncE, How ErnCTIVB ARE OSHA's COMPLAINT PROCE-
DURES (1979), noted in [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] EMPL. SAPETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 
'II 11,665. 
II [d. 
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vailing labor policy, the focus of the remainder of this article is 
narrowed to consideration of the employee in a union shop. In 
these sections the strong federal labor policy favoring collective ac-
tion emerges as one of the foremost barriers to an injunctive rem-
edy for the individual employee. 
IV. THE UNION SHOP: THE TENSION BETWEEN COLLECTIVE 
ACTION AND INDMDUAL ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
For the employee in a union shop, a determination of whether he 
may obtain an injunction based on his common law right to a safe 
work environment requires more than a consideration of whether 
such an injunction is consistent with the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act and administrative law. The fact that he is a party to a 
collective bargaining contract which may expressly or implicitly 
provide for arbitration of health and safety issues presents an ob-
stacle impeding direct employee access to the courts. 
A. The Strong Policy Favoring Arbitration as a Mechanism for 
Dispute Resolution 
The three cases comprising the Steelworkers Trilogy" manifest 
American labor policy's strong deference to arbitration. In those 
cases the Supreme Court outlined the appropriate function of the 
judiciary in resolving disputes arising under a collective bargaining 
agreement calling for a submission of grievances to arbitration. 
The Court determined that judicial inquiry must be confined to 
the question of whether the reluctant party agreed to arbitrate the 
grievance or agreed to give the arbitrator power to make the award 
he made.97 In other words the judiciary may not undertake to de-
termine the merits of a grievance;·· rather, it is limited to inter-
preting the grievance procedure of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Moreover, the judiciary must broadly interpret any 
arbitration clause in a labor contract: "an order to arbitrate the 
particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said 
with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not suscepti-
.. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United 
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United 
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) . 
... United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,582 
(1960) . 
.. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960); United 
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960). 
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ble of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."" Thus a 
presumption of arbitrability exists where it is unclear whether or 
not the arbitration clause is applicable to the matter in dispute. 
In Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America,loo the 
Supreme Court extended the presumption of arbitrability set forth 
in the Steelworkers Trilogy to cover safety disputes.lol In Gateway 
Coal, miners struck to protest an alleged safety hazard. The union 
refused a company offer to arbitrate the matter despite a broad 
arbitration clause in the collective bargaining contract which pro-
vided for arbitration of "any local trouble of any kind aris[ing] at 
the mine."IOl The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held the 
union had no contractual duty to submit the controversy to arbi-
tration.loa It reasoned that the usual federal policy favoring arbi-
tration of labor disputes should not extend to disputes over haz-
ardous conditions.104 The Supreme Court reversed. loa It rejected 
the view of the Third Circuit and held that the safety dispute in 
Gateway was covered by the arbitration clause in the parties' col-
lective bargaining agreement.loe 
The Court's holdings in Gateway and the Steelworkers Trilogy 
rellect both its desire to maintain consistency with the congres-
sional policy in favor of settlement of disputes through the ma-
chinery of arbitrationlO7 and its own appreciation of the value of 
arbitration in achieving industrial peace. lOS The Court recognized 
the unique role of grievance machinery in industrial self 
government: 
.. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &: Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 
(1960). 
100 414 U.S. 368 (1974). 
101 [d. at 379. 
101 [d. at 375. 
loa Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers of America, 466 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1972), 
rev'd, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). 
1 .. [d. at 1160. 
I" Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers of America, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). 
101 [d. at 379-80. 
107 See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &: Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
582 (1960). 
Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act states in relevant part: "Final 
adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method 
for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an ex-
isting collective bargaining agreement. ... Of 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976). 
I" See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &: Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
578 (1960). 
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Arbitration is the means of solving the unforseeable by molding a sys-
tem of private law for all the problems which may arise and to provide 
for their solution in a way which will generally accord with the variant 
needs and desires of the parties. The processing of disputes through 
the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and 
content are given to the collective bargaining agreement. 
. . . The grievance procedure is, in other words, a part of the con-
tinuous collective bargaining process. It, rather than a strike, is the ter-
minal point of a disagreement. lot 
Preference for the use of internal grievance procedures that pre-
cede the arbitral requirement was expressed in Republic Steel 
Corp. v. Maddox. 110 In that case Maddox brought suit against Re-
public Steel, his former employer, for severance pay11l allegedly 
owed him under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement 
existing between his union and Republic. The agreement contained 
a three-step grievance procedure to be followed by binding arbitra-
tion, but Maddox made no effort to utilize this procedure. Instead 
he sued for breach of contract.11I In a major decision, the Supreme 
Court reversed a lower court holding in favor of Maddox.118 It held 
that as a general rule, in cases to which federal law applies, an 
employee wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use 
of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and 
union as the mode of redress.ll4 The Court noted that "a contrary 
rule which would permit an individual employee to completely 
sidestep available grievance procedures in favor of a lawsuit has 
little to commend it. . . . [I]t would deprive employer and union 
of the ability to establish a uniform and exclusive method for or-
derly settlement of employee grievances."IUI 
The above cases taken together represent strong support for the 
position that when health and safety matters are not excluded118 
, .. [d. at 581. 
110 379 U.S. 650 (1965). 
III Severance pay is simply a payment made by an employer to an employee upon termi-
nation of employment. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1170 (3d ed. 1969). 
111 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 651 (1965). 
110 [d. at 659, reversing 275 Ala. 685, 158 So.2d 492 (1963). 
114 [d. at 652. 
111 [d. at 653. The rule set forth in Republic Steel has retained its vitality in subsequent 
cases. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Coe v. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum 
and Plastic Workers of America, 571 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1978). 
118 One possible outcome of the decision in Gateway which extended the "presumption of 
arbitrability" to safety disputes is that unions will seek contract language specifically ex-
empting safety disputes from the arbitration procedure. The United Auto Workers Union 
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from the collective bargaining agreement, a union employee must 
exhaust available grievance procedures before looking to the 
courts. 
B. The Case for a Private Right of Action: Limitations of the 
Grievance Machinery from an Employee's Perspective 
In Vaca v. Sipes ll7 a union member sued his union alleging he 
had been discharged from his employment in violation of the col-
lective bargaining contract between his employer and the union, 
and that the union had arbitrarily refused to take his grievance to 
arbitration. In reaching its decision in favor of the union, the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed its holding in Republic Steel Corp. v. 
Maddox ll8 that an employee must at least attempt to exhaust ex-
clusive grievance and arbitration procedures established by the col-
lective bargaining agreement. lie However, the Court recognized 
that "because these contractual remedies have been devised and 
are often controlled by the union and the employer, they may well 
prove unsatisfactory or unworkable for the individual grievant."1lI0 
After noting that one situation where this might occur is where the 
employee-plaintiff has been prevented from exhausting his con-
tractual remedies by the union's wrongful refusal to process the 
grievance, the Court held that an employee may bring an action 
against his employer in the face of a defense based upon the failure 
to exhaust contractual remedies, provided the employee can prove 
that the union as bargaining agent breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation in its handling of the employee's grievance.1I1 However, 
the Vaca guarantee to the employee that the union will exert a 
good faith effort in handling his grievance may not be sufficient in 
a safety context. 
Even good faith adherence by the union to its duty of fair repre-
sentation may not be consistent with the interests of the individual 
worker. illS In Vaca the Court held that a union does not breach its 
has already done so. ASHFORD, supra note 7, at 198. 
117 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
"" 379 U.S. 650 (1965). 
"8 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967) . 
• 1. Id. at 185. 
111 Id . 
• 11 It should be noted that by introducing safety provisions into its collective bargaining 
agreement with an employer, a union does not thereby assume a duty to provide employees 
with a safe place to work and is not chargeable with the duty to make safety inspections. 
The courts which have considered this question have reasoned that to hold the union liable 
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duty of fair representation merely because it settles a grievance 
short of arbitration.123 Yet, there may be reasons unrelated to the 
merits of a grievance why a union would not pursue the grievance 
and yet not be in breach of its duty of fair representation. For in-
stance, the best interest of the collective membership might not 
justify the expense of pursuing the grievance. lIl. In fact, the Court 
in Vaca held that a breach of the duty of fair representation is not 
established merely by proof that the underlying grievance was 
meritorious. lIlll 
Equally ominous for the individual grievant is the situation in 
which the union does not adhere to its duty of fair representation. 
Orchestration of arbitration awards and perfunctory prosecution of 
grievances by unions may make a sham of the grievance procedure 
for the individual employee.128 Orchestration of an arbitration 
award results when the union agrees with the company either ex-
plicitly or tacitly that a result contrary to the grievant's interest 
should flow from the arbitration. In This is then communicated ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly by the union's actions and arguments 
to the arbitrator, who tailors his award accordingly.lIl8 "[T]he arbi-
trator's acquiescence in a rigged award may result from the funda-
mental fact that he is dependent for his livelihood on his accepta-
bility to the parties who hire him. "lIl9 A union may orchestrate an 
award for several reasons: (1) it may be antagonistic to a grievant 
who has criticized or opposed union officials; (2) it may wish to 
obtain the arbitrator's inprimatur on a particular contractual in-
terpretation prior to formal renegotiation; or, (3) it may have made 
an agreement with the employer not to press the employee's griev-
for an employee's injury simply because the union agreed to safety provisions in its collec-
tive bargaining agreement would be contrary to national labor policy and would discourage 
the inclusion of similar or more effective standards in later contracts. Bryant v. Interna-
tional Union, United Mine Workers of America, 467 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1972); Higley v. Diston, 
Inc., [1975-76] OSHD (CCH) 11 20,689. 
n. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192 (1967) . 
... See Comment, Employee Challenge to Arbitral Awards: A Model for Protecting Indi-
vidual Rights Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1310, 1331 
(1977). See also Kilberg & Bloch, Making Realistic the Arbitration Alternative, 50 J. URB. 
L. 21, 43 (1972). 
II' Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 195 (1967) . 
••• Comment, Employee Challenge to Arbitral Awards: A Model for Protecting Individ-
ual Rights Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1310, 1333 
(1977) . 
• 17 Id. at 1332. 
II·Id. 
n. Id. at 1334. 
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ance in exchange for concessions by the employer on other is-
sues.180 In such situations it would be difficult for the employee to 
prove union bad faith. Even the Supreme Court has conceded 
this,181 lending validity to the comment that "in practice, individ-
ual worker rights against unfair union representation are more rhe-
torical than real. "lIlI 
When these limitations of the grievance-arbitration machinery 
are considered in the context of a health or safety grievance the 
reason for placing safety in a category different from that of wages, 
fringe benefits, or other working conditions becomes apparent. The 
importance of workplace safety to the individual and the commu-
nity compels consideration of the merits of the underlying griev-
ance before we concern ourselves with the maintenance of an effi-
cient machinery for resolution of disputes. The Appeals Court 
decision in Gateway recognized this: 
A dispute concerning the safety of the place and circumstances in 
which employees are required to work is sui generis . . . If employees 
believe that correctible circumstances are unnecessarily adding to the 
normal dangers of their hazardous employment, there is no sound rea-
son for requiring them to subordinate their judgment to that of an ar-
bitrator, however impartial he may be. The arbitrator is not staking his 
life on his impartial decision. It should not be the policy of the law to 
force the employees to stake theirs on his judgment. 111 
Access to state courts by way of a proceeding in equity without a 
requirement of exhausting available internal remedies is one way 
an employee can seek a more satisfactory resolution of his griev-
ance. That is not to say that internal remedies should not be uti-
lized. Rather, it is to say -that the choice should be that of the 
grievant's at every stage of the procedure. Existing law with regard 
to contractual claims is not an appropriate analogy.1M 
'ao Id. at 1332. 
III See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,58 n.19 (1974). 
,a. Marchione, A Case for Individual Rights Under Collective Agreements, 27 LAB. L.J. 
738, 744 (1976). 
, .. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers of America, 466 F.2d 1157, 1159-60 (3d Cir. 
1972), rev'd, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). 
'M An employee seeking an injunction would not be suing for breach of contract. How-
ever, his grievance would be arising out of the same fact situation 88 that frequently covered 
by a collective bargaining agreement. The strong policy favoring resolution of grievances 
through the use of internal grievance machinery is therefore relevant. 
156 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 9:133 
V. PRECEDENT FOR INDIVIDUAL ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
In cases in which individuals have asserted federal statutory 
rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, courts have attempted to accommodate federal labor 
policy and the important policy interests manifested by the federal 
statutes involved. Those cases stand as precedent for the individ-
ual who seeks to enforce his common law right to a safe workplace. 
Although in the former cases statutory rights were being pursued 
and in the latter instance a common law right is involved, the same 
key element is present in both situations: the advancement of a 
policy interest strong enough to justify an accommodation of fed-
erallabor policy. 
A. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.l8Ii involved "the proper rela-
tionship between federal courts and the grievance-arbitration ma-
chinery of collective-bargaining agreements in the resolution and 
enforcement of an individual's rights to equal employment oppor-
tunities under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... " 186 
Following discharge by his employer, Harrell Alexander, a black 
male, filed a grievance under the collective-bargaining agreement 
between his employer and his union.187 The agreement contained a 
broad arbitration clause;la8 disputes were to be submitted to a 
multi-step grievance procedure and if the dispute remained un-
resolved, it was to be remitted to compulsory binding arbitra-
tion.utl The union processed Alexander's grievance and in the final 
prearbitration step Alexander raised the claim that his discharge 
resulted from racial discrimination. The company rejected all of 
Alexander's claims and the grievance proceeded to arbitration. 
However, prior to the arbitration hearing Alexander filed a charge 
of racial discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Commis-
sion, which referred the case to the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC). The arbitrator ruled that Alexander's 
discharge was for cause.1'o Following the EEOC's subsequent de-
... 415 U.S. 36 (1974) . 
... [d. at 38. Title vn is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976) . 
... Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 39 (1974) . 
... [d. at 40 . 
.. e [d. at 41. 
14. [d. at 42. 
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termination that there was not reasonable ground to believe that a 
violation of Title VII had occurred, Alexander filed an action in 
federal district court alleging that his discharge resulted from a ra-
cially discriminatory employment practice in violation of the Civil 
Rights Act.lfl 
The District Court granted Gardner-Denver's motion for sum-
mary judgment, holding that Alexander was bound by the arbitral 
decision and thereby precluded from suing his employer under Ti-
tle VII.H2 The Court of Appeals affirmed.H3 The U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed. Iff The Court held that an employee's statutory 
right to a trial de novo under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
19641411 is not foreclosed by prior submission of his claim to final 
arbitration under the non-discrimination clause of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. It concluded that: 
the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal 
policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be accom-
modated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy 
under the grievance-arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment and his cause of action under Title VII.I4e 
In reaching its decision, the Court focused on the statutory 
scheme and purpose peculiar to Title VII.147 However, much of the 
Court's reasoning is readily applicable to the case of an employee 
seeking an injunction to enforce his common law right to a safe 
workplace. In concluding that a cause of action was not precluded 
by prior arbitration, the Court relied on what it inferred was con-
gressional intent that Title VII was to "supplement rather than 
supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment 
discrimination."!" Certainly, in enacting the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, Congress evinced a similar intent to afford over-
lapping remedies for enforcement of occupational safety. He 
'4' [d. at 43. 
'4. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971). 
'4. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972). 
'44 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 43 (1974). 
'4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(O(1) (1976) allows for a private right of action as a means of 
obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII. 
'4' Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974). 
'4' [d. at 44-49. 
'4. [d. at 48-49. 
'4' The language of the Act makes clear that it was not intended to supersede or in any 
other manner affect an employee's common law rights with regard to occupational safety. 
See text at note 80 supra. 
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In addition, in Alexander, the Court emphasized the indepen-
dence of contractual and statutory rights: 
In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindi-
cate his contractual right under a collective-bargaining agreement. By 
contrast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts inde-
pendent statutory rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate 
nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely 
because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence. 
And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to 
be enforced in their respectively appropriate forums.110 
Thus the Court made clear that a collective bargaining agreement 
which provides for arbitration does not necessarily prevent consid-
eration in a different forum of separate claims arising from the 
same facts.lIU There is a similar distinction between contractual 
and common law rights with regard to occupational safety, and an 
inconsistency does not necessarily result from permitting both 
rights to be enforced to their respective forums. 
B. The Extension of Alexander 
In Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp.,111 employees brought suit against 
their employer for an alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA)118 without first attempting to use the grievance proce-
dure specified in their collective bargaining agreement. The FLSA 
mandates payment of certain overtime compensation to covered 
employeeslU and creates a cause of action in favor of aggrieved 
employees to recover from their employer any unpaid overtime and 
an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. III The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that an employee' may 
bring suit for an alleged violation of the FLSA without first at-
tempting to vindicate that right through the grievance procedure 
specified in the bargaining agreement. 1M The court took the posi-
tion that the rationale of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver supported 
this limitation on the exhaustion doctrine in the context of FLSA 
wage claim suits. It reasoned that the pervasive statutory scheme 
110 415 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1974). 
101 See Blumrosen, supra note 20, at 729. 
"0 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975) . 
.. I 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 219 (1976). 
1'" 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1976). 
III 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1976). 
1" Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
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of the FLSA, like that of Title VII, evidenced congressional intent 
that rights based on the FLSA be judicially enforced. lll'7 Moreover 
it concluded that because the arbitrator's authority is limited by 
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement the arbitrator 
cannot be the final arbiter of rights created by statute.1II8 The 
holding in Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp. echoed dictum in an earlier 
D.C. Circuit court opinion where the court indicated that its inter-
pretation of the relationship between arbitration and the Mine 
Safety Actlll8 is similar to the Supreme Court's analysis in Alexan-
der v. Gardner-Denver Co. ISO 
However, not all jurisdictions have been as willing to extend the 
rationale of Alexander. In Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, 
Inc.,lel the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that em-
ployees' rights to sue under the Fair Labor Standards Act for over-
time compensation were foreclosed by their prior submission of the 
same claim to final arbitration under the grievance procedure of 
their collective bargaining agreement. Similarly, in Marshall v. 
Coach House Restaurant, Inc.,ul the District Court for the South-
ern District of New York adopted the analysis of the court in Sat-
terwhite and held that when an employee submits a wage claim to 
binding arbitration he may not thereafter litigate the claim in a 
FLSA action. These courts concluded that the analysis in Alexan-
der was not applicable to FLSA suits. In essence they reasoned 
that in a wage claim context, the national policy favoring arbitra-
tion assumes greater significance then when Title VII rights are at 
issue. The courts engaged in a balancing test and concluded that 
since FLSA wage rights do not enjoy the same "high priority" as 
do Title VII rights, interference with the policy favoring arbitra-
tion is not justified. 181 
With reference to the relationship between the holding in Alex-
ander and FLSA wage claim suits, the decisions in Satterwhite 
117 Ido at 1158. 
'II Id. at 1158·59. 
lit Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ SOl to 960 (1976). 
'00 See Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 776 n.15 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974). 
'" 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1974), certo denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974); cf. Union de Tron-
quistas de Puerto Rico, Local 901 v. Flagship Hotel Corp., 554 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1977) (arbi-
trator's interpretation of an administrative regulation as it related to employees covered by 
a collective bargaining agreement held final and binding) . 
... 457 F.Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) . 
... Ido at 950-51. 
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and Coach House represent a position contrary to that taken by 
the D.C. Circuit. However, if viewed on another level the differ-
ences in the cases represent only differences in degree. All of the 
cases support the proposition that the principles set forth in Alex-
ander need not be understood as applicable only to cases involving 
racial discrimination under Title VII. The D.C. Circuit goes so far 
as to extend Alexander to wage claim disputes. ls4 Using a stricter 
balancing test, other courts would not go as far. However, these 
courts do recognize that there are contexts in which individual 
rights may outweigh national policy favoring internal resolution of 
disputes. Occupational safety should be one of them. The recog-
nized importance of workplace safety puts it, like discrimination, 
in a category justifying an accommodation between individual 
rights and federal labor policy. 
Critics of the idea of broadening individual rights under collec-
tive agreements argue that such an extension would weaken the 
collective bargaining process by undermining the employer's incen-
tive to arbitrate.lsa It has been argued that if a grievance procedure 
cannot be made exclusive, it loses its desirability as a method of 
settlement. ISS However, there is still ample incentive for collective 
bargaining without exclusive grievance procedures, and individual 
access to the courts is not necessarily inconsistent with use of the 
grievance-arbitration machinery. The Supreme Court has stated 
that "[t]he primary incentive for an employer to enter into an ar-
bitration agreement is the union's reciprocal promise not to 
strike. . . . 'a no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the quid 
pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance 
disputes to the process of arbitration.' "167 Just as the Court rea-
soned in Alexanderls8 with regard to judicial remedy under Title 
VII, it may be reasoned that most employers will regard the bene-
fits derived from a no-strike obligation as outweighing whatever 
costs may result from according employees an arbitral remedy 
against safety and health hazards in addition to their remedy 
under common law. lee 
.84 Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975) . 
••• See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965); Marchione, A Case for 
Individual Rights Under Collective Agreements, 27 LAB. L.J. 738, 739 (1976) . 
... See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965) . 
••• Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1974) (quoting Boys Markets, 
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970» . 
... Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,55 (1974) . 
... Id. 
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Finally, "the grievance-arbitration machinery of the collective-
bargaining agreement remains a relatively inexpensive and expedi-
tious means for resolving a wide range. of disputes .... "170 Where 
the collective-bargaining agreement contains adequate provisions 
relating to workplace health and safety and "where arbitral proce-
dures are fair and regular, arbitration may well produce a settle-
ment satisfactory to both employer and employee."171 Thus provi-
sion for arbitration may in many cases preclude the need for resort 
to the judicial forum. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 
1970 evidenced legislative recognition of the importance of assur-
ing safety in workplace environments. However, developments 
under the Act have proven insufficient to effectively cope with the 
problems which led to its enactment. Moreover, it may be difficult 
for an employee to utilize other statutory self-help options without 
risking job loss. As an altemative mode of redress, an employee 
faced with a continuing occupational hazard should be permitted 
to seek injunctive relief from a state court if he can establish the 
right to such relief under equitable principles of state law. 
Such a proceeding has not been pre-empted by congressional 
adoption of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Moreover, it 
should not be considered inconsistent with American labor policy. 
To insure healthful workplace conditions the merit of a safety 
grievance must take precedence over maintenance of an efficient 
machinery for resolution of labor disputes. As is the case where 
other important interests are at stake, where safety is at issue, la-
bor policy must accommodate individual rights . 
.. 0 [d. 
171 [d. 
